Geneva: A long-standing proposal to legally guarantee that nuclear-armed states will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries is again drawing attention as global nuclear tensions remain high.
Known as a negative security assurance, the pledge is intended to reassure countries that have given up nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, most such assurances remain political commitments rather than a universal, legally binding obligation.
A simple promise with major consequences
The idea is straightforward: countries that do not possess nuclear weapons would receive a binding assurance that they would not become targets of nuclear threats or attacks.
Supporters argue that such a guarantee could strengthen confidence in the global non-proliferation system and make it easier for non-nuclear countries to resist pressure to develop their own weapons. The proposal would not require nuclear warheads to be dismantled or military arsenals to be changed.
The issue has returned repeatedly to the Conference on Disarmament, but consensus among nuclear-armed states has remained elusive.
Nuclear states differ over the pledge
The five nuclear-weapon states recognised under the NPT — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — have issued varying forms of negative security assurances. The United Nations Security Council recognised these assurances in Resolution 984 in 1995.
However, several assurances contain conditions or exceptions. China has maintained the most comprehensive no-first-use position, while other nuclear powers retain circumstances in which nuclear weapons could potentially be used.
Some nuclear-weapon states have nevertheless accepted legally binding commitments through protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties.
Why the debate matters now
The argument has gained urgency as nuclear threats have featured more prominently in conflicts involving nuclear-armed states. Supporters say a universal legal assurance could strengthen the incentive for countries to remain non-nuclear.
Yet turning the promise into international law would require nuclear powers to accept constraints on future nuclear policy — precisely the point where strategic interests and legal commitments collide.
For countries without nuclear weapons, the question is therefore larger than a diplomatic pledge: can the international system offer credible security without asking every nation to build its own nuclear deterrent?